Goldsmiths - University of London

Professor Max Velmans

BSc PhD CPsychol FBPsS

Consciousness, mind/body interactions, philosophy of psychology

Research interests

My main research interest is in the area of consciousness studies, with a particular focus on integrating work in philosophy, cognitive psychology, neuropsychology, and mind/body relationships in clinical practice. From 1990 onwards, I have around 100 publications in this area, mostly addressing the trickier theoretical problems of consciousness in ways that try to bridge science, philosophy and "common-sense" (over 30 of these papers and chapters are available on-line in the CogPrints archive). Many of the issues addressed are foundational for psychological science, for example, the relation of brain studies to individual experience, the nature of subjectivity, intersubjectivity and objectivity, how to avoid the mysteries of dualism and the implausibilities of reductionism, how to develop methodologies appropriate to the study of experience, and so on. Overall this amounts to a programme for a nonreductionist science of consciousness. Understanding Consciousness (Routledge/Psychology Press, 2000) (UK, USA) is my main book. This provides an appraisal of Consciousness Studies at the beginning of the 21st Century, along with an analysis of reflexive monism, a novel resolution of the "hard" problems of consciousness.  This work has now been deepened and updated for a 2009 second edition (reviews). How to Understand the Causal Relationship of Consciousness and Brain (Imprint, 2003) (UK, USA) provides additional in-depth discussions of one of the hardest problems. My jointly edited The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness (Blackwell, 2007) ( UK, USA) surveys current scientific and philosophical thinking in this area, and the 1996 edited text, The Science of Consciousness (UK, USA), provides tutorial reviews for students and researchers. The edited collection Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: New Methodologies and Maps (John Benjamins, 2000) (UK, USA) also examines methodological issues and suggests ways of integrating this interdisciplinary field. My research interests include the therapeutic and medical aspects of the mind/body relationship, the puzzles surrounding free will, the relation of psychology to physics, and Eastern versus Western views of the nature of mind. I am fascinated by the breadth and depth of this topic and enjoy the "grand debates." I have given numerous papers at national and international conferences in this area, and have helped to form and, from 2003 to 2006, chaired the Consciousness and Experiential Psychology Section of the British Psychological Society (CEP). In 2006 I also co-founded a new form of “Consciousness Cafe”, in Totnes, where I now live.

My earlier research interests and publications include extensive work with the deaf resulting in around 20 publications. For example, I invented a new frequency transposing hearing aid, patented in 1974 in the UK, USA, and Japan, which was the subject of an extensive evaluation over a 10-year period (funded by the British Technology Group, The Department of Health and Social Security, and the Medical Research Council).

Selected publications

Velmans, M. (2009) Understanding Consciousness, Edition 2. London: Routledge/Psychology Press.

Velmans, M. (2009) How to define consciousness—and how not to define consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16(5), 139-156.

Hughes, G., Velmans, M. and de Fockert, J. (2009) Unconscious priming of a no-go response. Psychophysiology 46(6), 1258-1269.

Velmans, M. (2009) Preconscious free will. In H. Pashler (ed.) The Encyclopedia of the Mind. Sage (in press)

Velmans, M. (2008) Reflexive monism. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 15 (2), 5-50.

Velmans, M. (2008) How to separate conceptual issues from empirical ones in the study of consciousness. In R. Banerjee and B.K. Chakrabarti (eds) Models of Brain and Mind: Physical, Computational and Psychological Approaches. Progress in Brain Research, Vol. 168, Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp 1-9.

Velmans, M. (2008). Psychophysical nature. In H.Atmanspacher and H.Primas (eds.) Wolfgang Pauli's Philosophical Ideas and Contemporary Science. Springer, pp 115-134.

Velmans, M. (2008) Consciousness and the physical world. In M. Weber and W. Desmond, Jr. (eds.), Handbook of Whiteheadian Process Thought, Frankfurt/ Lancaster: Ontos Verlag, pp 371-382.

Bergstrom, Z. M., Velmans, M., De Fockert, J. and Richardson-Klavehn, A. (2008) ERP evidence of successful voluntary avoidance of conscious recollection. Brain Research, 1151, 119-133.

Velmans, M. & Schneider, S. (eds) (2007) The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. New York: Blackwell.

Schneider, S. and Velmans, M. (2007)An introduction to the Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. In M.Velmans and S. Schneider (eds.) The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. New York: Blackwell.

Velmans, M. (2007). Dualism, reductionism and reflexive monism. In M.Velmans and S. Schneider (eds.) The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. New York: Blackwell.

Velmans, M. (2007). An epistemology for the study of consciousness. In M.Velmans and S. Schneider (eds.) The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. New York: Blackwell.

Velmans, M. (2007). The co-evolution of matter and consciousness. Synthesis Philosophica, 44 (2), 273-282.

Velmans, M (2007) Dualist, reductionist, enactive and reflexive accounts of phenomenal consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 6(4), 547-563.

Velmans, M (2007) How experienced phenomena relate to things themselves: Kant, Husserl, Hoche, and reflexive monism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 6, 411-423.

Velmans, M (2007) Heterophenomenology versus critical phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 6, 221-230.

Velmans, M. (2005) Are we out of our minds? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 12(6), 109-116.

Velmans, M. (2005) Review of Gray, Jeffrey (2004) Consciousness: creeping up on the hard problem. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 19, 529-530.

Velmans, M. (2005) Causal interactions of consciousness, unconscious mind and brain. In P Giampieri-Deutsch (ed) Psychoanalysis as an Empirical, Interdisciplinary Science: Collected Papers on Contemporary Psychoanalytic Research. Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences. pp 91-117.

Velmans, M. (2004) Why conscious free will both is and isn’t an illusion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 27(5), 677.

Velmans, M. (2004) Is the brain in the world or the world in the brain? London: Goldsmiths College. ISBN 190415851X.

Velmans, M., Morrison-Coulthart, L.M., Colley, A., Foot, H, Foreman, N., Kent, G., Kwiatkowski, R. and Sloboda, J. (2004) Guidelines for Minimum Standards of Ethical Approval in Psychological Research. Leicester: The British Psychological Society.

Velmans, M. (2003) Is the brain in the world, or the world in the brain? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 26, 427-429.

Velmans, M. (2003) Preconscious free will. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10, 42-61.

Velmans, M. (2003) How could conscious experiences affect brains? Exeter: Imprint Academic. ISBN 0907845398.

Velmans, M. (2002) Could phenomenal consciousness function as a cognitive unconscious? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25, 357-358.

Velmans, M. (2002) How could conscious experiences affect brains? (Target Article for Special Issue). Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9, 3-29.

Velmans, M. (2002) Making sense of causal interactions between consciousness and brain. (reply to eight commentaries on my target article) Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9, 69-95.

Velmans, M. (2002) How could images heal anything? In A. A. Sheikh (ed.) Healing Images: The Role of Imagination in the Healing Process. Amityville, New York: Baywood Publishing Company, pp 53-71.

Velmans, M. (2001) Heterophenomenology versus critical phenomenology: A dialogue with Dan Dennett. On-line debate.

Velmans, M. (2001) A natural account of phenomenal consciousness. Communication and Cognition, 34(1&2), 39-59.

Velmans, M. (2001) Consciousness. In Michie, J (ed) A Reader’s Guide to the Social Sciences, London: Fitzroy Dearborn, pp 271-272.

Velmans, M. (2001) What’s wrong with cognitive science? a review of P. Dodwell Brave New Mind: A thoughtful inquiry into the nature and meaning of mental life. American Journal of Psychology 114, 623-628.

See a further selection of my papers, including on-line publications