Event overview
02070785048
Prof. Jonathan Edwards (UCL London), The 2006 Whitehead Lectures in Cognition, Computation & Creativity
In around 2001 Steven Sevush (1) and Jonathan Edwards (2) independently came to the conclusion that phenomenal consciousness must be a property of an individual cell, not a group of cells. This conclusion at first seems bizarre and even terrifying. However, it may make a number of things easier to explain; the seamlessness of consciousness, the evolution of consciousness from protozoal times, the layout of the brain and the strange reports of people with damaged brains. The idea requires there to be a phenomenon within cells which is notionally 'quantised' but rests otherwise on a purely classical biophysical analysis with no need for 'quantum computation', entanglement or suchlike. The current proposal is that all that is required is conventional cable-theory based neurophysiology plus a piezooelectric field, possibly of the type already known to exist in cochlear hair cells. It is not sugggested that single cells think, but merely that each is a separate observer and that there is no more global observer in our heads. Despite all attempts so far it has proved impossible to discover why this idea might be wrong, but suggestions are welcome.
References
1. See Steven Sevush under Cogprints or J Theoretical Biology in press.
2. See http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~regfjxe/aw.htm or J Consciousness Studies
2005,12, no 4/5, 60-76.
The Whitehead Lectures in Cognition, Computation & Creativity
Dates & times
| Date | Time | Add to calendar |
|---|---|---|
| 18 Jan 2006 | 4:00pm - 5:00pm |
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