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Lecture

Autopoietic theory, enactivism and computationalism: possible ways of integration - Mario Villalobos


7 Jun 2016, 2:00pm - 3:30pm

The Garden Room, St James Hall (Block 1)

Event overview

Cost Free
Department Computing
Contact A.Martin(@gold.ac.uk)
07901 65 35 28

Mario Villalobos, Universidad de Tarapacá, Chile, will give a public lecture entitled "Autopoietic theory, enactivism and computationalism: possible ways of integration".

In cognitive science, computationalism is the thesis that natural cognitive systems are computing systems. Computing systems, traditionally, have been understood as systems that receive inputs, manipulate some form of internal representation, and emit outputs.

In opposition to this view, enactivism claims that natural cognitive systems are not computing systems. Cognitive systems, according to enactivism, are non-representational autonomous systems (meaning they are not input-output systems).

Put things this way, enactivists seem to have good reasons to think that computationalism is incompatible with their view of cognitive systems. But is this really so?

In this presentation, building on Maturana’s autopoietic theory, I argue that there is no such incompatibility. Firstly, according to recent mechanistic computational theories, computing systems are not necessarily representational systems. That is, if cognitive systems are non-representational systems, as enactivists think they are, nothing appears to prevent that they may also be computing systems. Secondly, I argue that computing systems may exhibit the kind of autonomy that enactivists think is distinctive of cognitive systems. That is, if cognitive systems are autonomous systems, as enactivists think they are, nothing appears to prevent that they may also be computing systems.

In summary, I argue that viewing cognitive systems as enactive systems is not incompatible with viewing them as computing systems. In removing some of the barriers that separate computationalism and enactivism, I hope to motivate, in both computationalists and enactivists, the exploration of integrative research programs in cognitive science.

Mario Villalobos
School of Psychology and Philosophy
Universidad de Tarapacá, Chile
Institute of Philosophy and Complexity Sciences, Chile

Dates & times

Date Time Add to calendar
7 Jun 2016 2:00pm - 3:30pm
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